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Can National Currencies Survive?
James Tobin*
Abstract
Fixed exchange rate, pegs to hard currencies that can be adjusted, are fragile, the more so
the more mobile are capital funds across currencies and national markets.  Once market
participants doubt, for whatever reason, the ability of a developing or emerging economy’s
central bank to meet its commitment to redeem it currency in hard currency at the promised
rate, they will race to claim the country’s external reserves.  Vulnerability to crises becomes
greater as financial markets become less regulated and more internationally open.  To escape
currency crises, a country may lock its money to that of a reserve-cu ren y country, as by a
“currency board.”  This may, if an only if reserves are ample and all other economic objec-
tives are subordinated, maintain the peg and hold down inflation.  But it sacrifices monetary
autonomy and seignorage, leading in effect and perhaps literally to substitution of the
reserve currency for the local currency as unit of account and means of payment.
When crises hit, the IMF and other lenders give highest priority to restoration of
credibility and confidence in the currency under attack.  They require the victim country to
take drastic restrictive monetary and fiscal measures, whether or not irresponsibility in these
policies brought on the crisis.  Since these measures damage the economy, businesses, and
banks, they may not restore confidence.  Lenders of last resort are essential and should
concentrate above all on replenishing liquidity.
The adjustable-peg system has outlived its usefulness.  For most countries it is better
to let exchange rates float in markets, like those of the big three currencies, dollar, yen, and
deutsche mark (or euro).  Even so, unimpeded inflows and outflows of liquid funds result
in unwelcome exchange rate movements.  Protection against them, by taxes or special
reserve requirements, are desirable, and need not curtail useful capital flows.  Banks and
businesses need to be prevented from incurring net short term debt positions in hard
currency.  Equity and direct fixed capital are the desirable vehicles for developmental capital
movements.
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The major private bank in a small country fails. Frightened depositors and creditors
desert this country, its banks, and its currency, and the central bank’s plea for foreign help
gets little response.  Affected creditors in neighboring countries, banks and central banks
alike, scramble for internationally liquid assets.  Interest rates zoom up everywhere, loans
are called or not renewed, economic activity sinks, and unemployment rises rapidly to
politically hazardous rates.  The managers of the world monetary system, central bankers
individually and collectively, strive above all to maintain the credibility of the system and
confidence in existing currency rates.  But the effects of their deflationary policies on
business conditions destroy confidence instead.  In the end country after country has to
abandon its commitments to redeem its currency at the promised price. In country after
country, then and only then did economic recovery begin, and it took many years.
The place was not Asia but Europe and North America. The year was 1931.  The bank
was the Credit Anstalt in Vienna.  The monetary system was the gold standard, as revived
after the hiatus of World War I.  Central bankers, finance ministers, prime ministers, and
presidents put defense of the gold values of their currencies above all else.  Weimar
Germany maintained the gold content of the mark but rationed its gold reserves.  Its
deflationary policies in 1931–32 — high interest rates, tax increases, no relief or work for
the jobless — paved the way for Hitler’s accession to power in January 1933.  In September
1931 Britain was at long last forced off gold, after suffering from hard times ever since
1925, when Chancellor Churchill overvalued sterling by returning to gold at the 1914 gold
and dollar value of the pound.  In the United States, as the recession of 1929–30 became the
Great Depression and the banking system collapsed, the Federal Reserve and President
Hoover stubbornly defended the gold value of the dollar.  (Hoover actually had some com-
monsense Keynesian instincts for fiscal and monetary activism until his Treasury warned
him that the dollar’s gold standard was threatened.)  Roosevelt devalued in 1933, and
recovery began.
I concur with the views of younger scholars that policymakers’ auri sacra fames
(Keynes’s term) was responsible for turning a recession into a Great Depression.  The
international monetary system — the interconnection of national currencies with one
another — was then and is now a crucial factor in world economic stability and prosperity.
The presumption that currency crises are just the fault of the victims is still all too prevalent
among the statesmen of world finance and, of course, among media pundits.  The view is
that good policies and proper institutions will enable a prudent government to keep its
currency convertible at an announced parity in gold or in other currencies.  The vulnerability
of any economy, especially a small country caught in the commodity and financial markets
of a big world, is insufficiently appreciated. So is the intrinsic fragility of any fixed
exchange rate.
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The End of the Bretton Woods Gold-Dollar Standard
It’s a quarter-century since the United States ditched the Bretton Woods system and
adjustable pegs were abandoned in favor of floating rates — not always clean floating to be
sure — among the major currencies — dollar, yen, and deutsche mark (to which other major
Western European currencies have been tied most of the time).  Floating among the big three
presumably will continue as the euro succeeds the deutsche mark.
A fixed-rate system had failed again. One reason was that the United States could not
devalue the rate of exchange of the key currency with other currencies without
the concurrence of the other governments.  The United States wanted Japan and Germany,
in particular, to appreciate (by lowering the price of gold in their currencies), and they
thought that adjustment was the responsibility of the United States.  A second reason, which
complicated the currency rate conflict, was the peculiar role of gold in the system.  Dollars
held by foreign governments were convertible into gold at a fixed price. Private dollars were
not supposed to be convertible, but they became so de facto as the United States and the
United Kingdom, until 1968, fed the private gold market to keep the free-market gold price
from getting out of line. U.S. balance of payments deficits increased dollar debt in official
hands and depleted the U.S. gold reserves available to redeem those dollars. In the ultimate
impasse in 1971–73 the United States abandoned its commitment to pay gold for dollars.
Unlike Herbert Hoover, Richard Nixon was not willing to sacrifice American prosperity for
the gold standard or for fixed currency exchange rates.
I think he was right.  I know that among many wise and experienced observers, there is
nostalgic longing for a return to fixed rates and talk of a “new Bretton Woods.”  The grass
is always greener!  Floating nominal rates are blamed for excessive variability in real
exchange rates.  The unanticipated appreciation of the dollar against the yen in the early
1980s looms large in the memories of American businesses affected.  I suspect, however,
that the shocks that have moved exchange rates significantly since 1973 would have brought
irresistible pressures on fixed rates and reserve crises like those of the 1960s and early
1970s.
Instead of being blamed for volatility of nominal and real exchange rates, floating rates
should perhaps be credited for accomplishing economically desirable revaluations without
currency crises.  A recent example is the 40 percent decline of the yen against the dollar
over two years, never a problem serious enough to be reported on the front pages of
American newspapers.
At the opposite extreme, the way to escape currency crises is to adopt a permanently and
exclusively a common international currency, as is about to occur within the European
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Union.  This, of course, has its own problems.  Perhaps a worldwide common currency will
be adopted worldwide some time in the next century, but not soon.
A Voice from the Past
Given my lack of experience and expertise in the World Bank’s world, I am unqualified to
speak at this conference, but my old friend and once colleague Joe Stiglitz insisted that I do
so anyway.  To show that I have at least thought about international monetary problems
before and to show that today’s issues are not altogether new, I am going to read you
something written in 1972, shortly after the Smithsonian Agreement was concluded, hailed
by President Nixon as the greatest monetary agreement in history but dead in less than a
year.  The passage occurs in a short book on domestic macroeconomic policy called The
New Economics One Decade Older:
The most important barrier to flexible monetary policy is the ever-increasing international
mobility of liquid capital.  The Eurodollar market is unifying the short-term money markets
of the major countries on both sides of the Atlantic. European countries have felt keenly, and
complained bitterly, that they have lost autonomy in monetary policy.  Even the autonomy
of the United States Federal Reserve has been diminished . . . .  The interest sensitivity of
short-term funds can be expected to continue to increase and to pose even greater problems
for the international monetary system and for national monetary policies. . . .  [A]s sub-
stitution elasticities increase . . . the boundless resources of private arbitrageurs will just
erase any rate differentials the national monetary authorities try to create and sustain.
There is no more important item on the agenda of the coming negotiations for
international monetary reform.  On the one hand, some agreed central coordination of
national monetary policies is essential. Otherwise the common international interest rate
level, from which feasible national deviations are limited, will be left to anarchy and tug-of-
war.  On the other hand, there is nowhere near enough economic and political unity among
Europe, North America, and Japan to support a single international monetary policy for the
whole group.  The new international arrangements must protect some national autonomy in
monetary policy.
Unless the . . . world acquiesces permanently in [a] fixed-exchange-rate dollar standard
. . . we cannot count on a system in which the Federal Reserve makes world monetary policy.
Moreover, the Common Market countries will undoubtedly seek greater monetary coordin-
ation among themselves, so that Europe will have more muscle in contest with the Federal
Reserve.
. . . [It] is clearly desirable to preserve some possibilities of autonomy in national or
continental monetary policies and to defend them against the growing internationalization
of money markets.  Our economies and governments are not sufficiently unified in other
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respects — goods, labor, and capital markets, taxes and fiscal policies — to live with a
single . . .  monetary policy.  That is where the analogy with the centralization of Federal
Reserve policy [in the United States] breaks down.  The same forces that unified short-term
securities markets throughout the U.S. also produced . . . national markets in goods, labor,
and capital . . . [that] can handle regional differences in . . . circumstances in a way that is
not possible in today’s international economy.  And a national government can carry out
compensatory fiscal redistributions between regions; there is no comparable international
mechanism in prospect.
How can some international monetary autonomy be preserved?  Some sand has to be
thrown into the well-greased channels of the Eurodollar market.
I went on to advocate increasing exchange risk by more flexible exchange rates, either
outright floating or widened bands around frequently adjusted parities.  Then comes for the
first time a proposal of “an internationally agreed uniform tax, say 1%, on all spot con-
versions of one currency into another,” in order to “drive a wedge between short-term
interest rates in different national markets.”
My propositions today are similar, but applied to a wider universe. Let me summarize
them.  First, for most countries fixed exchange rates in their usual form, adjustable pegs, are
a bad idea.  Developing countries would be well advised to follow the example of the major
capitalist countries and let their currencies float like the dollar, yen, and deutsche mark.  It
is hard to understand why this had not become normal practice long ago.  It would have
avoided the worst consequences of recent adjustments of exchange rates. Is the reason that
it would relax discipline for “sound” policies exerted by fixed rates?
Second, while globalization of financial markets — the liberalization and deregulation
of international financial transactions — has contributed importantly to the economic
progress of developing and emerging economies and can continue to do so, these trends also
threaten the monetary sovereignty of those countries.  This is especially true for a country
committed to a fixed exchange rate, an adjustable peg that it is committed not to adjust.  The
logic of financial globalization is to increase the elasticities of substitution between risk-
adjusted rates of return on local assets and debts and those in dollar markets, until the local
central bank has no margin within which it is free to determine domestic interest rates.
Third, once the central bank cannot make monetary policy, a logical next step is
“dollarization” — or “yennization” or “euroization” — allowing one of the hard currencies
to become the smaller country’s means of payment and unit of account. This does have some
advantages.  The trouble, obviously, is that the big central bank has no reason to consider
a satellite's conditions and interests.  The same problems will arise in the European
monetary union, but in that case the central bank has responsibility to all the members of the
union.
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Fourth, to preserve a local currency with residual monetary sovereignty, some friction
in international financial institutions and markets needs to be retained.  This is true also in
a regime of floating rates, though floating itself is some protection.  The new global
financial system should be able to contribute to development without rendering central
banks impotent or whole currencies obsolete.  The governments, banks, and businesses of
developing countries should eschew short-term demand debt or short-term debt in hard
currencies.  Flows of capital to developing countries should preferably take the form of
direct fixed investment or equity.
Fifth, developing countries need to build institutions of financial reform and regulation
supportive of modern national financial systems and of independent currencies.  The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) should concentrate on its intended function as lender
of last resort for its members.  The resources of the IMF and of its members are pitifully
small and should be augmented.
Adjustable Pegs and Bank Runs
The trouble with adjustable pegs is that they can be adjusted and therefore invite speculation
that they will be.  They are no less a potential invitation for speculation than are floating
rates.  Indeed, a discrete change in an official parity is much more traumatic. It is a loss of
face and a blow to pride.  It is an administrative decision, that is to say a decision of policy
and politics.  It necessarily requires responsible officials — finance ministers, chancellors,
central bank chairmen — to go back on their solemn word.  Moreover, they or their
successors have the unenviable task of ch osing a new rate in a climate poisoned by distrust,
clouded by uncertainties about the fundamentals, and dominated by unpredictable
psychology.  It’s easy to get it wrong, prolonging and aggravating the crisis.  For all these
reasons, there is great temptation to stick with an overvalued parity too long.
A central bank managing and defending a currency pegged to an external hard currency,
or to a basket of hard currencies, is like a conventional commercial bank.  The bank’s
deposit liabilities are fixed in nominal value and payable on demand or quite soon.  They
are “backed” largely by illiquid or imperfectly liquid assets of uncertain ultimate value.  The
bank’s cash reserves — of currency and coin and deposits in the central bank — are only
a fraction of its cash liabilities.  The bank is nevertheless solvent if patient, informed
valuations of these assets equal or exceed the liabilities with high probability.  “Patient”
means that the valuations allow time for the assets to yield their expected values.  Premature
liquidations by use or sale are costly or impossible, the more so the greater the proportion
of its assets the bank must liquidate.
The discrepancy is the basis for the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity, for
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the belief that “marking to market” may underrate the eventual value of the bank, and for
the function assigned to a “lender of last resort,” namely to allow the bank time to attract
deposits or liquidate assets.  The distinction is not absolute.  The bank’s world is changed
by a bout of illiquidity, and by the events that bring it about, in ways that increase the
likelihood of insolvency.  Help from a lender of last resort may rescue a bank on the brink
of insolvency.  On the other hand, the lender may find itself keeping alive a crippled bank
that will never survive on its own.
Clearly the expectations and risk assessments of depositors and participants in asset
markets are crucial. In a benign equilibrium of the bank these estimates are rational and
generate patterns of behavior and valuations that keep a basically sound bank liquid.  The
“last resort” does not arise, and its lender stays on the sidelines, while its existence supports
the equilibrium.  The benign equilibrium is, however, fragile.  Each depositor is continu-
ously deciding whether to withdraw cash or not, and her decision depends mainly on what
she thinks others are deciding.  Adverse events or rumors may tip the scale to runs and
panics.  Contagion from failing banks nearby can doom intrinsically solvent banks.
Why should a depositor keep funds in a bank if she gains nothing and may lose every-
thing?  Bank services are one reason, and nowadays some interest is generally credited.  But
governmental deposit insurance, explicit or implicit, is usually essential to keep depositors
content.  To offset the moral hazard incentive to banks and depositors to seek risky gains
while the insurer absorbs the losses, it is necessary to regulate and oversee the balance
sheets of insured banks, as the debacle that followed deregulation of the U.S. savings and
loan industry in the 1980s dramatically confirmed.
Besides the benign equilibrium, supported by deposit insurance and balance sheet
surveillance or not, there is a second, malign equilibrium in which the bank has failed and
closed.  The depositors have withdrawn all the bank’s reserves in cash.  Other assets have
been sold at losses, in a desperate quest for liquidity.  Or better, a regulator has closed the
bank promptly enough to conserve some assets for eventual settlements with depositors,
insurers, and other creditors.
The analogy of a national currency to a bank is pretty clear.  The central bank has
promised to buy back its own currency with external currency at an announced price, and
for that purpose holds reserves of hard currency.  In this benign equilibrium expectations in
currency markets around the world support behaviors that validate the expectations and
sustain the pegged exchange rate.  In the second, pessimistic, equilibrium the central bank
defaults on its commitment.  Like bank depositors worried about what other depositors will
do, holders of a pegged currency fear that they will act too late to save their assets.  Potential
claims on central bank reserves include not only the external liabilities of the central bank
and the government but also those of private banks, businesses, and households, domestic
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and foreign.  All the liquid local currency assets they hold can potentially be tendered to the
central bank and government to buy up their holdings of hard currency.  If they are then
spent or exchanged for nonliquid assets, they can again fall into hands that will convert them
into hard currency.
The good equilibrium is fragile, because estimates of its viability at home and abroad
are interdependent, and panicky rushes to convert local into external currency can force the
central bank to abandon its commitment and let the currency fall — even though the
economic fundamentals indicate that the currency is worth, even if not its original pegged
value, much more than its crisis price.
The analogy between the bank deposit-versus-local currency choice and the domestic-
versus-foreign currency choice is imperfect in one respect.  Whereas an uninsured bank
deposit will not appreciate above its contracted cash value, the local currency’s exchange
value can rise as well as fall. In practice, however, the exchange rates of developing country
currencies often gravitate to the high ends of their bands or of traders’ confidence intervals.
When currency speculators see only downside risk, they sell — just as depositors run with
their cash if they see no chances that their bank’s condition will improve.
Advocates of fixed rates regard the good equilibrium as normal and sustainable and the
runs as anomalous and avoidable.  It is just a matter of adopting and maintaining policies
that engender confidence.  In the design of so-called bailout packages to reverse attacks on
the currency’s exchange rate in times of incipient crisis, the first priority is to promise
measures that the “market” will regard as sound.  But they have to overcome the adverse
momentum of sauve qui peut panic.
Moreover, a suspect currency typically is thought to be overvalued.  Perhaps the
inflation rate has exceeded those of c mpetitors and trading partners.  Perhaps export
markets are slumping.  Perhaps the current account is turning into deficit, reflecting
borrowing for domestic consumption rather than productive investment.  There may be no
credible package of measures that can save the exchange rate or reverse its decline.
An extraordinarily high interest rate is the usual emergency therapy.  The idea is to de-
value the currency against its own future value, inducing people to hold onto it despite the
expected decline in its foreign exchange value.  If this works, it raises both the current and
the expected market exchange rate.  But tomorrow, if the adverse expectation is fulfilled,
the rate is again lower.  Only when (and if) favorable changes in the markets occur can the
currency be stabilized without keeping the interest rate extraordinarily high.  Meanwhile,
the economic damage of that interest rate may be dragging down the exchange rate’s
prospects.
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Currency Board, Money Board?
A currency board requires 100 percent reserves in hard currency against the local-currency
monetary base.  If reserve assets can be bought from the central bank by bank checks, this
requirement is no guarantee that the central bank will not run out of reserves.  If local
currency is a ration coupon for external reserves, bank depositors could obtain these tickets
by withdrawing cash from their deposits.  Distrust of the currency would then be accom-
panied by a bank panic.  After all, the purpose of the currency board device is to freeze the
central bank into a permanent commitment to an exchange rate fixed at a particular value,
if necessary forcing draconian tactics (most likely astronomical interest rates) to avert
defaults on its currency exchange commitment.
Combining a currency board with fractional reserve banking is awkward.  If the size of
the monetary base is limited to the central bank’s holdings of international reserves, the
central bank has no way to compensate for increases in the public’s demand for local
currency at the expense of its willingness to hold local bank deposits.  This could come
about for various reasons: some random and innocuous, such as increases in income and
consumption spending, some reflecting public concern over the soundness of banks.
However caused, the result of shifting a dollar of high-powered money from bank reserves
to publicly circulating currency is to substitute one dollar of low-powered money in
currency form for, say, five dollars of low-powered money in bank-deposit form (assuming
a reserve ratio of one-fifth).
Those of us with long memories recall the bank runs in the United States in the early
1930s, triggered by bank failures and in turn the cause of further failures.  The unwillingness
or inability of the Federal Reserve to respond by open market purchases to expand the total
monetary base was disastrous, dooming both the economy and the banking system.  At the
time Federal Reserve monetary-base liabilities were not constrained by a currency-board-
type 100 percent gold reserve requirement, although they were supposed to be backed by
some combination of gold, Treasury bonds, and commercial paper eligible for rediscount.
The point here is that the currency board makes it impossible for the central bank to
perform its normal domestic functions, either that of macroeconomic stabilizer or that of
lender of last resort.
A 100 percent reserve requirement on bank deposits is a logical extension of the
currency board idea to a “money board” system.  It would allow the system, originally used
for British colonies dependent mainly on paper money, to catch up with the rise of bank
deposits as the main medium of exchange.
A hundred-percent-reserve banking system would tighten the country’s commitment to
its exchange parity, but at heavy cost.  It would deprive the economy of the intermediary
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functions performed by fractional reserve banks.  Presumably some nonbank intermediaries
would take their place.  They would seek liabilities to the public as close to bank deposits
as the authorities permit.  These would require some regulation, although the availability of
fully backed deposits in narrow banks would relieve the government of moral compulsion
to guarantee the liabilities of other intermediaries.
A currency board, or a more comprehensive money board, sacrifices real macro-
economic performance in all its significant dimensions — production, income, growth,
trade, saving, and investment — to the strength of the currency and indirectly to the
prevention of inflation.  When the successes of the device are touted, it is in these narrow
terms.  The currency board is an extreme form of the fixed exchange rate as a “real anchor,”
a tactic of national self-discipline popular in recent years.  However, the true test of
successful policy is not conquering inflation by an open-ended sacrifice of prosperity but
conquering inflation while achieving full employment and reasonable growth in economic
well-being.  Argentina stabilized its price level by tying its currency to the dollar, but its
unemployment rate is stuck in double digits.
In any case, it is by no means sure that a currency board or any similar fixed-exchange-
rate commitment will work.  Once again, there is a bad outcome as well as a good
equilibrium.  If the initial stock of external reserves is small, the cost in economic activity
of cutting the stock of local currency as required may be devastating, and set off a scramble
for hard currency.  Those who get their hands on local currency will buy up the central
bank’s hard currency and force further deflation on the banks and the economy.  These
unstable dynamics will force the country to cut itself loose from the currency board.
A successful commitment to a fixed exchange rate requires an ample initial stock of
unborrowed reserves, as well as policies that reinforce the virtuous circle of the “good
equilibrium,” as in Hong Kong (China) and Taiwan (China).  In less auspicious circum-
stances the “real anchor” strategy has contributed to overvaluation of the currency.  This can
happen when the small country’s inflation exceeds expectations or when the anchor
country’s inflation declines.
Why Not the Dollar?
The currency board arrangement is a way, albeit somewhat technically flawed, surrendering
independent monetary policy and acknowledging vassaldom.  At that point, why not go all
the way, drop the local money, and adopt the hard currency as a medium of exchange and
unit of account?  Argentina is well on its way to doing this.  Unfortunately Federal Reserve
policy-makers are not going to weigh macroeconomic problems in Patagonia even as much
as those in Idaho.  But this is the destination to which financial globalization is taking
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developing countries, whether the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and the other lords of inter-
national finance acknowledge it or not.
In a dollarized regime some of the functions central banks play now might be taken over
by private banks.  They would accept deposits in dollars, as many do already.  The accep-
tance in New York of checks in dollars on Korean or Indonesian banks might be subject to
a discount reflecting the reputation of the bank and its assets, like the discounts on
banknotes issued by wildcat banks in the American West in the 19th century.  Those
discounts could take the place of an exchange rate.  Of course, in a worldwide integrated
financial system U.S.–chartered banks would be competing in the Republic of Korea and
Indonesia for deposits and loans.
The informal use everywhere of dollar bills as hand-to-hand currency and mattress
hoards is one thing.  Adoption of the dollar as legal tender, in place of or in addition to a
country’s national currency, is quite another.  This would best be negotiated between
governments, so that the handling of checks between banks in the smaller country and the
United States could be systematized.  Similar problems have been painstakingly resolved
in the European Union.  Effective internationalization is not unmitigated laissez faire.
Dollarization deprives the government of the small country not only of monetary
sovereignty but also of seignorage,  Given the costs of borrowing in dollars, inclusive of
country risk premium, this could be a substantial fiscal loss.
In Praise of Dirty Floating
Surely the most important lesson of the currency crises is the most obvious.  Don’t peg your
exchange rate.  Let it float.  Don’t even confine it to a broad band, with or without a moving
central parity.  If it hits the bottom of the band, it is pegged and invites speculative attack.
Just let it float.  I am not a purist. I think dirty floating is quite all right.  Interventions are
sometimes called for, and need not be transparent.  For occasional dirty floating, defensive
or offensive, hard currency reserves are needed.  The central bank must husband them in the
national interest, whether the exchange rate is fixed or floating.  In either case, the govern-
ment needs to limit those private external financial transactions that may force the country
to lose reserves or to suffer unwelcome currency depreciation. 
Globalization and Financial Reform
Developing countries, especially the emerging Asian tigers, have made great strides in
liberalizing and “globalizing” their financial systems, markets, and institutions.  Local
nonfinancial businesses borrow, lend, and sell shares in major international markets.  The
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balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions contain assets and liabilities in
various currencies.  The gross volumes of currency transactions involving these economies
have multiplied, and the net flows of private capital into these economies have greatly
increased.  No doubt these developments reflect liberalizations that have opened these
economies to foreign investments and made them increasingly attractive.
At the same time, some aspects of financial globalization are perilous to the health of
central banks and economies, as recent currency crises show.  This is especially clear in
fixed exchange rate or adjustable peg regimes.  When private banks and businesses can
borrow in whatever amounts, maturities, and currencies they choose, they create future
claims on their country’s reserves.  This may force on the central bank and government
monetary and fiscal policies that sacrifice the country’s prosperity and growth in order to
protect the reserves on which these debts are potential claims.  They might indeed threaten
to exhaust the nation’s reserves.
Integration and perfection of financial markets will bring money market interest rates
in different financial centers closer and closer together.  Last year American, Japanese, and
European  banks saw loans to Korean banks as great opportunities because the interest rates
were higher than those they could earn at home. At the same time, Korean banks seized the
chance to borrow at what they regarded as low rates.  Arbitrage was chipping away at the
risk premium implicit in the rate differentials.  The longer the peg of the Korean won sur-
vived, the closer the Korean short rate, whether on won or on dollar liabilities, would come
to New York or Tokyo rates.  As net demands across markets become more elastic with
respect to interest rate differentials, the less autonomy the central bank of the smaller
country will have over its interest rates and monetary policies.  The smaller country loses
monetary sovereignty and becomes in effect a monetary province of the large country to
whose currency its own was pegged.
Short-term private bank debts in hard currencies were fatal to the Korean and Indonesian
currencies in the last months of 1997.  These debts, though they seemed to the foreign
lenders and domestic borrowers directly involved to be straightforward business deals,
visited severe negative externalities on their fellow citizens, bringing about currency crises
devastating to whole economies.
The central bank, committed to hnor the peg and to maintain the country’s terms of
trade, has to protect its reserves.  It cannot be indifferent to the claims on those reserves
negotiated by private parties, domestic and foreign, who ignore the social risks.  An obvious
precaution is to limit even to zero the net indebtedness (particularly the short-term debt) in
hard currency allowed any private bank.  The device used in Chile and Colombia, an extra
reserve requirement, is evidently successful.  It is more important to slow down incoming
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funds than outgoing money, and to install such hurdles permanently than just in
emergencies.
These grains of sand in the wheels are, to be sure, departures from the goal of complete
integration, with universally free asset markets blind to currency denominations, geo-
graphical locations, political jurisdictions, and nationalities of transactors.  But it is hard to
see how governments outside the major industrial capitalist democracies can maintain
monetary sovereignty without some regulations to protect their international reserves.
In the recent “bailout” packages of the Asian economies, further cross-border financial
liberalization was one of the conditions the IMF and the U.S. Treasury imposed for official
loans, despite the evident facts that excessive private external short-term debt was, if not a
cause of the crisis, a serious aggravation of it, and that banking and financial institutions
seemed to need more regulations in several respects as well as fewer in other respects.
U.S. experience suggests the importance of distinguishing among several kinds of public
regulations of financial institutions and markets.  First are requirements designed to make
markets work better, by outlawing fraud and self-dealing and by requiring depositories,
investment banks, and sellers of financial instruments to inform the public clearly and
completely what exactly it is they are selling.  Second are limitations on balance sheets of
intermediaries, in cases where the public cannot be sufficiently protected by information
alone or where the state has an implicit or explicit responsibility to compensate losers.
Third are protections of competition against concentration and collusion in restraint of trade.
Fourth are regulations, like reserve requirements and capital ratios, essential to make
government policies workable.  Fifth are orderly legal procedures for handling bankruptcies
and defaults.  (A useful precedent for handling the rash of insolvencies now afflicting some
Asian economies is the U.S. depression-era Reconstruction Finance Corporation.  For
example, the RFC put public money into defunct companies by investing in their preferred
stock. Preferred stock was also offered to depositors in failed banks up to the amount of
their lost deposits.)
On the other hand, U.S. history also is full of insalubrious regulations designed to
protect various vested interests against competition — forbidding entry into particular
markets, setting prices and interest rates, distorting market outcomes by taxes and subsidies.
Presumably we would like developing countries to follow our good examples and not our
bad.  Let us encourage them to build good national financial systems, not just to open their
doors ever wider.
Some critics of the victims of the currency crises and of the “bailouts” themselves assert
that if governments and international agencies would just get out of the way, free markets
would reach ideal solutions to all the problems.  We economists should be cautious in
applying Invisible Hand propositions — the theorems of optimality of competitive
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equilibrium that we love so much — to money and finance, especially international money
and finance.  Those theorems apply strictly to a single closed real economy, without money,
presumably one where incredibly efficient multilateral barter determines relative prices and
allocates resources over future times and states of nature.  Fiat money does not figure in
production or utility functions, so why it has any particular value or any value at all is one
of those puzzles economic theorists pose for themselves.  Even more mysterious are the
relative values (exchange rates) of various fiat moneys, none of which has intrinsic value.
Since these are creatures of governments, it is not surprising that some government
regulations are necessary to make them work.  I certainly am not saying that we can dispense
with governments or money.  Quite the opposite.  We don’t in fact have moneyless efficient
multilateral barter. I am simply warning against relying on a priori ideological shortcuts
instead of pragmatic architecture.
We Need Lenders of Last Resort
Moral hazard has become almost as fashionable an expression as transparency.  Many
pundits have discovered that moral hazard is intrinsic in “bailouts,” the prejudicial word for
lender-of-last-resort operations, and they are generally quite indignant about it.  Among
economists and financiers looking for better ways of handling debt crises in future,
minimization of moral hazard seems to be the prime goal.  I think this is a misplaced pri-
ority. In liquidity crises that necessitate emergency loans, lenders and borrowers may be
spared losses of principal, but they hardly escape wholly unscathed.  They are not likely to
find the experience one they would wish to repeat.  More important, the social costs of
unmitigated currency collapse extend far beyond the parties to financial deals, to ordinary
people who lose jobs, savings, and income.  Limiting these third-party effects is worth
putting up with some moral hazard.
The IMF needs to take its lender-of-last-resort responsibility more seriously.  It was
founded to tide members over during temporary liquidity crises, not to shape the permanent
economic structures of economies and guide their long-run development strategies.  For its
fire-department function, the IMF needs more money, not less, and more than is currently
under debate.  Aggregate quotas of $150 billion?  That’s peanuts!  Within larger quotas,
members should have bigger unconditional drawing rights.
A Plea for Humility
A final remark:  One of the more unseemly byproducts of the rec nt Asian crises is the
triumphalism of American commentaries on the events.  The currency troubles were
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interpreted as demonstrating the hollowness of the “Asian model” of capitalism.  Not many
years ago, many Americans admired and feared the performance of Japan and then the
smaller Asian economies.  We wondered if their model of capitalism, in particular of
corporate governance and employment, was better than ours, and hated to face that fact.
Some silly popular economics books exploited these worries.  Then the Japanese slump of
the 1990s and now the comeuppance of the miraculous emerging Asian tigers, in contrast
to American and British prosperity, have given us new confidence in the “Anglo-American
model.”  Some spokesmen for our kind of capitalism have not resisted the temptations of
triumphalism, even though the overzealous reach of our practitioners of global finance might
bear some responsibility for the crises.
